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GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTES:
REMAINING PROBLEMS AND THE NEED
FOR UNIFORMITY
I. INTRODUCTION
There are more than one million divorces in the United
States annually,' over one-half involving minor children.2
In a growing number of the divorces which involve children,
the custodial parent denies a grandparent the opportunity to
see the children of the failed marriage. The unfortunate
severing of relationships between grandparents and
grandchildren may also occur when one or both of the par-
ents die, and it is especially common if the children are sub-
sequently adopted.4
Why would a parent deny a child the opportunity to
communicate with loving and devoted grandparents? The
answers to this question vary from a parent's desire to re-
press memories of an unhappy marriage or a deceased
spouse,5 to a parent's desire to establish a new family, per-
haps with a new spouse as the child's adoptive parent. 6 Es-
trangement is sometimes the result of a "power struggle"
between the parent and grandparent over control of the
child. It may also stem from a fear that the grandparent will
repeat mistakes the parent perceives the grandparent made
in raising his or her own children.7
Grandparents' responses to the denial of contact with
their grandchildren have been as diverse as its causes. In-
creasingly, grandparents are turning to the judicial system
for resolution of these family disputes as well as lobbying for
1. Divorcesfall, marriages up in '82, Milwaukee J., Mar. 16, 1983, § 2, at 6, col. 1.
2. Divorce American Style, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42.
3. Id. at 48.
4. See infra notes 118-61 and accompanying text.
5. Grandparents'Rights, Phil Donahue Show (aired in Milwaukee, Wis., Jan. 21,
1983) (show featured United States Congressman Mario Biaggi and child psychiatrist
Arthur Kornhaber). See also Grandparents. The Other Victims of Divorce and Cus-
tody Disputes: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human Services of the Select
Committee on Aging, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-50 (1982)
(statements of grandparents).
6. See, e.g., In re Goldfarb, 6 N.J. Super. 543, 70 A.2d 94 (1949).
7. A. KORNHABER & K. WOODWARD, GRANDPARENTS/GRANDCHILDREN: THE
VITAL CONNECTION 195-96 (1981).
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changes in the visitation laws.8 At common law, grandpar-
ents were deemed to have virtually no rights with respect to
their grandchildren.9 Recently, however, legislatures in a
majority of the states 10 have altered this by providing grand-
parents the legal right to petition for visitation privileges if
they are deprived of contact which may benefit both the
grandparent and the grandchild." In addition to state legis-
lation, the United States Senate and House of Representa-
tives introduced concurrent resolutions in 1983 dealing with
grandparent visitation.' 2  The resolution, passed by the
House and now pending in the Senate, endorses the concept
of a uniform state act providing "grandparents with ade-
quate rights to petition state courts for privileges to visit their
"113grandchildren .... ,
This comment will examine the traditional judicial re-
sponse to grandparents' petitions to see their grandchildren
and will evaluate the array of visitation statutes currently in
force. Specifically, this comment will analyze the effect on
grandparents' visitation rights if the parent removes the
grandchild from the jurisdiction or if the grandchild is sub-
sequently adopted. Finally, this comment will address the
need for uniformity in the laws of grandparent visitation.
II. GRANDPARENTS' RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW
Case law in the area of grandparent visitation is replete
8. See generaly Middleton, Grandparents Unite to Gain Visitation Rights, 68
A.B.A. J. 33 (1982): Divorce American Style, supra note 2, at 47-48; Grandparents seek
protection of their rights, Milwaukee J., Dec. 29, 1982, § 3, at 8, col. 1.
9. See generaly Foster & Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissi-
tudes, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 643, 644-46 (1979).
10. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the importance of permanent relationships between
grandparents and grandchildren, see A. KORNHABER & K. WOODWARD, supra note 7,
at 67-70, 200-13. See also F. DODSON, How TO GRANDPARENT 155 (1981): Dr' rce
American Style, supra note 2, at 48 (" 'Grandparents offer grandchildren an emotional
sanctuary from the everyday world. [Children with close relations to a grandparent]
are secure in the knowledge that many people care for them."' (quoting child psychi-
atrist Arthur Kornhaber)).
12. H.R. Con. Res. 45, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. Con. Res. 40, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983).
13. H.R. Con. Res. 45, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. Con. Res. 40, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1983). The House of Representatives passed the resolution by a voice vote
on April 19, 1983.
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with contradictions and question-begging 14 and often ap-
pears to weigh the conflicting interests of the parent and the
grandparent without considering the best interests of the
child.' 5 At common law, under the aegis of the "parental
rights doctrine," a grandparent was granted visitation privi-
leges with his or her minor grandchild only in "exceptional
circumstances."' 6  The general rule, first promulgated in
Succession of Reiss, 7 was "that the obligation ordinarily to
visit grandparents is moral, and not legal."' 8 Inasmuch as
Reiss has been recognized as the guiding precedent in the
area, analysis of the court's reasoning is warranted.
Reiss was brought before the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana by a maternal grandmother who was appealing a lower
court order regarding visitation with the children of her late
daughter.' 9 The lower court had ordered the father to take
the children to visit their grandmother and had also ordered
the grandmother to visit the children at their father's home.20
The grandmother appealed, seeking visitation at her home
without any requirement that she visit the children at their
home because she "thought it proper to send them to
14. For example, some courts intimated that grandparent-grandchild visitation
would be granted if it was in the best interests of the child, and simultaneously as-
serted that such vistitation can never be in the child's best interests if the parent ob-
jects. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
15. The "best interest of the child" is the governing standard in child custody and
visitation determinations. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 151 Pa.
Super. 612, 617, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (1943). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
lists five factors commonly relied upon to assess the best interests of the child:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or par-
ents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interst;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-98 (1973). But see generally
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979), wherein the authors criticize the traditional "best interests" approach and ad-
vocate replacing it with a "least detrimental alternative" standard.
16. Foster & Freed, supra note 9, at 645.
17. 46 La. Ann. 347, 15 So. 151 (1894).
18. Id. at 353, 15 So. at 152.
19. Id. at 349-50, 15 So. at 151.
20. Id. at 350, 15 So. at 151.
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[her]. ' 2 1 The supreme court dismissed the appeal, denying
the existence of a legal right to visit one's grandchildren.22
The court reasoned that to permit judicial intervention by a
grandparent would diminish parental authority.23  The au-
thority of a parent was deemed so comprehensive as to pre-
clude any inquiry into the father's motive for denying
visitation. 4 The Reiss court acknowledged the desirability
of fostering ties between grandparent and grandchild, but
opined that "the coercive measures which must follow judi-
cial intervention" are not an efficacious means of restoring
family relationships.5
With only a few exceptions, 26 cases following Reiss simi-
larly rejected grandparents' petitions for visitation privileges.
Most jurisdictions treated the issue as a matter of law, con-
cluding that no legal basis existed for grandparental visita-
tion. 7 Courts subscribing to this view would entertain a
21. Id. at 350-51, 15 So. at 151-52.
22. Id. at 353, 15 So. at 152-53.
23. Id. at 352, 15 So. at 152.
24. Id. Accord Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (1947). "'So
fundamental are the rights of parenthood that infringements thereof have been held
to constitute an encroachment on the personal liberty of the parent forbidden by the
Constitution."' Id. at _ 177 P.2d at 629 (quoting 39 AM. JUR. 593, 594). See In re
Goldfarb, 6 N.J. Super. 543, 70 A.2d 94 (1949) (court cannot question parent's deci-
sion regarding grandparent-grandchild visitation).
The United States Supreme Court has often acknowledged parents' interest in
raising children without interference. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents. . . . And it is in recognition of
this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). See also Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. Reiss, 46 La. Ann. at 353, 15 So. at 152. Psychiatry professor Andre Derdeyn
asserts that legal intervention into private matters should be used only as a last resort,
advising that grandparent-grandchild contact "achieved by less adversary means is
surely more satisfactory and more likely to be maintained." Grandparents seekprotec-
tion oftheir rights, supra note 8. But see infra note 30.
26. See infra notes 32-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the excep-
tions to the general common-law rule.
27. See, e.g., Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, _.._, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (1947) (a
grandparent's right is "no different from that of any third person or stranger" and
therefore a court cannot compel a parent to allow a grandparent visitation privileges);
Green v. Green, 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (affirming trial court denial of
visitation notwithstanding jury's verdict that the granddaughter's best interests would
be served by permitting visits with her paternal grandparents). See also Wood v.
Parkerson, 163 Colo. 271, 430 P.2d 467 (1967); Jackson v. Martin, 225 Ga. 170, 167
S.E.2d 135 (1969) (per curiam); Smith v. Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966).
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grandparent's petition for visitation only if the grandparent
challenged the fitness of the custodial parent. In Jackson v.
Fitzgerald,28 this rationale was succinctly explained:
[I]n the absence of a charge of unfitness a grandparent is a
"third person," without legal standing to demand custody.
In the absence of any charge of unfitness or miscon-
duct, there was plainly no basis for disturbing the father's
right to custody. And, logically, the same must be said as
to the claim for visitation rights. The right of visitation de-
rives from the right to custody. The court could not award
the plaintiff visitation rights without impinging on the fa-
ther's vested right of custody ....
Courts are not insensitive to the yearning of grandpar-
ents and other relatives for the company of children in
their families. But such cannot be translated into a legal
right without a showing that it is dictated by the needs and
welfare of the child. In the absence of such a showing, cus-
todial control goes along with custodial responsibility.29
Some courts have professed to base the denial of grand-
parents' visitation rights on the best interests of the child
while simultaneously asserting that the denial of such visita-
tion was always in the child's best interests. These courts
propounded the theory that it would be contrary to the
child's best interest to subject the child to the competition for
affection which court-ordered visitation would necessarily
engender.3 0  The often inadequate solution was to advise
28. 185 A.2d 724 (D.C. 1962).
29. Id. at 725-26 (footnotes omitted). Accord Veazey v. Stewart, 251 Ark. 334,
472 S.W.2d 102 (1971) (grandmother conceded that the mother was a "good
mother"); People ex rel. Schachter v. Kahn, 241 A.D. 686, 269 N.Y.S. 173 (1934) (per
curiam) (father appeared to be a proper guardian; therefore, the court lacked
jurisdiction).
30. See Commonwealth ex rel McDonald v. Smith, 170 Pa. Super. 254, 258, 85
A.2d 686, 688 (1952) ("a contest for the child's affection . . . can lead only to the
detriment of the child."). See also Commonwealth ex rel Flannery v. Sharp, 151 Pa.
Super. 612, 617-18, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (1943) (child's welfare "must not be shattered in
the crossfire" resulting from irreconcilable differences existing between the parent and
grandparents). Contra Evans v. Lane, 8 Ga. App. 826, 70 S.E. 603 (1911). In Evans,
the court granted visitation to the maternal grandmother, despite dissension among
the families, and stated.
It may be possible that this little one as an innocent messenger traveling from
the home of on [sic] of "these warring families" . . . to the other all uncon-
sciously may be the means of pouring oil upon the troubled waters, may be a
balm of Gilead to heal the festering wounds, and thus effect a reconcilia-
tion. .. .
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grandparents that if they would "cultivate a tolerable rela-
tionship" with the child's parents, perhaps voluntary visita-
tion could be arranged.
The common law did recognize exceptions to the general
rule; however, the exceptions were only applicable in very
limited factual situations.3 2  One such exception applied
when the custodial parent had previously consented to
grandparent-grandchild visitation, typically pursuant to a di-
vorce decree.33 If the custodial parent later challenged the
visitation, courts generally held that the grandparent had a
legally enforceable right to visitation 3 4 provided that contin-
ued grandchild-grandparent contact was deemed in the best
interests of the grandchild.
A few courts granted visitation rights to grandparents
based upon findings that the continuation of the grandpar-
ent-grandchild relationship was essential to the physical or
emotional health of the child.36 Such a finding was made,
however, only if the grandchild had lived with the grandpar-
ent for a significant portion of the grandchild's life. 37 Visita-
Id. at _ 70 S.E. at 606-07.
31. Commonwealth ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 151 Pa. Super. 612, 618, 30 A.2d
810, 812 (1943).
32. See generally Note, Visitation Rights of a Grandparent Over the Objections of a
Parent: The Best Interests ofthe Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 51 (1976-77).
33. See Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step Closer to the
Best Interests ofthe Child, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 387, 390-92 (1977). See also Foster &
Freed, supra note 9, at 645-46.
34. Brock v. Brock, 281 Ala. 525, _, 205 So. 2d 903, 909-10 (1967) (on rehearing)
(legal validity and enforceability of the grandparents' right was created by the par-
ents' divorce stipulation and decree). See also Bookstein v. Bookstein, 7 Cal. App. 3d
219, 86 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1970); Boyles v. Boyles, 14 Ill. App. 3d 602, 302 N.E.2d 199
(1973). But see Commonwealth ex rel McDonald v. Smith, 170 Pa. Super. 254, 258-
59, 85 A.2d 686, 688 (1952) (extensive visitation rights were, in effect, "partial cus-
tody" and deprived the parent of "complete and uninterrupted custody").
35. Bookstein v. Bookstein, 7 Cal. App. 3d 219, 223-24, 86 Cal. Rptr. 495, 498-99
(1970) ("there is sufficient evidence. . . the child would benefit from the visits to his
grandparents."); Boyles v. Boyles, 14 IUl. App. 3d 602, 604,302 N.E.2d 199, 201 (1973)
("the continuation of the relationship between child and grandparents, which may be
promoted by visitation, may be a positive benefit affecting the best interest of the
child.").
36. Benner v. Benner, 113 Cal. App. 2d 531,248 P.2d 425 (1952) (severing grand-
parent-grandchild relationship might have created nervous and emotional distur-
bance); Stockton v. Guthary, 415 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (separation might
cause severe emotional trauma).
37. E.g., Brock v. Brock, 281 Ala. 525, _, 205 So. 2d 903, 910 (1967) (on rehear-
ing) (child had lived with grandparents for several years, creating "ties of affection");
1984]
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tion was granted in this situation because the child who was
being removed from familiar surroundings should be spared
the exacerbated trauma of a total separation from the cus-
tomary environment.38 It was hoped that maintaining ties of
affection to his or her grandparent would lessen the severity
of the "separation trauma. 39
After determining that one of the exceptions was applica-
ble to the particular facts of a case, courts then evaluated the
child's best interests. At this point in the analysis, some
courts gave weight to the value of maintaining ties with both
the paternal and maternal sides of the grandchild's family.40
Such courts were amenable to awarding visitation privileges
to a grandparent if the grandchild's noncustodial parent was
deceased or unavailable for visitation.41
Under the common-law exceptions, a particularly trou-
blesome problem was posed when a grandchild was adopted
by a stepparent, as occurred in Lee v. Kepler.42 In Lee the
maternal grandmother was awarded visitation privileges
pursuant to a divorce decree. The child's natural father re-
married and his spouse adopted the child. Although the
grandmother's visitation rights were enforceable against the
natural father, they were not enforceable against the child's
Bookstein v. Bookstein, 7 Cal. App. 3d 219, 86 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1970) (child lived with
grandparents for five years); Benner v. Benner, 113 Cal. App. 2d 531, 248 P.2d 425
(1952) (following parents' divorce, child lived with mother and grandmother for three
years); Commonwealth ex rel. Goodman v. Dratch, 192 Pa. Super. 1, 3, 159 A.2d 70,
71 (1960) (court distinguished its decision in Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v.
Smith, 170 Pa. Super. 254, 85 A.2d 686 (1952), stating "[w]e consider it to be almost
inhuman to completely isolate the child from his grandparents.").
38. Stockton v. Guthary, 415 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). See also
Benner v. Benner, 113 Cal. App. 2d 531, _ 248 P.2d 425, 426 (1952).
39. Stockton v. Guthary, 415 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). AccordKew-
ish v. Brothers, 279 Ala. 86, 181 So. 2d 900 (1966).
40. Boyles v. Boyles, 14 I1M. App. 3d 602, _, 302 N.E.2d 199, 201 (1973) (mother
died and court deemed continued contact with maternal grandparents beneficial);
Commonwealth ex ret Williams v. Miller, 254 Pa. Super. 227, _ 385 A.2d 992, 995
(1978) ("Except under unusual circumstances, no child should be cut off entirely from
one side of its family.").
41. McKinney v. Cox, 18 Ill. App. 2d 609, 153 N.E.2d 98 (1958) (visitation at
home of paternal grandparents while father was in military service). See also Boyles
v. Boyles, 14 M1. App. 3d 602, 302 N.E.2d 199 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Williams
v. Miller, 254 Pa. Super. 227, 385 A.2d 992 (1978); Gotz v. Gotz, 274 Wis. 472, 80
N.W.2d 359 (1957).
42. 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
[Vol. 67:730
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adoptive mother because she obtained the status of a natural
parent and had not given her consent to the visitation.43 Fol-
lowing the adoptive mother's wishes, the visits were
terminated.
Adoption likewise barred visitation in Commonwealth ex
re. Dogole v. Cheny." Dogole involved a child who was ini-
tially adopted by a husband and wife. After the adoptive
mother died, the adoptive father remarried and his new wife
adopted the child.45 The first wife's mother sought, but was
denied, visitation privileges.46 The court based its denial of
visitation upon the finding that the "maternal grandmother"
was "neither a blood nor an adoptive relative of the child."47
As the above discussion indicates, the common law was,
in most cases, unresponsive to grandparents' desires to visit
with grandchildren. Lacking a judicial remedy, grandpar-
ents were compelled to turn to state legislatures to seek vin-
dication of their "right" to visit with their grandchildren
through legislation.
III. STATUTORY VISITATION RIGHTS
In an attempt to alleviate the harshness of the common-
law rule, in the late 1960s state legislatures began enacting
statutes concerning grandparent visitation.48 These statutes
provide a legal avenue for grandparents who have been de-
nied visitation privileges with their grandchildren.49
A. A Brief Survey
Forty-four states50 presently have statutes which purport
43. Id. at 573. The court held that "[t]he parental rights which the step-mother
gained through adoption are not subject to be controlled or affected by prior orders
for custody or for visitation in the divorce suit to which the father had been a party."
Id.
44. 196 Pa. Super. 46, 173 A.2d 650 (1961).
45. Id. at 47, 173 A.2d at 650.
46. Id at 48, 173 A.2d at 651.
47. Id at 47-48, 173 A.2d at 651. Dogole is criticized in Foster & Freed, supra
note 9, at 662-63. See also Note, supra note 32, at 65-66.
48. See Note, supra note 33, at 392. See also infra note 50.
49. See generally Foster & Freed, supra note 9, at 655-56.
50. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); AIuz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1211.1, 57-135
(Supp. 1983); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 197.5, 4601 (West 1984); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-
1984]
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to give a legal right of visitation to grandparents.' I In addi-
tion to authorizing grandparent-grandchild visitation, some
statutes apply to great-grandparents,5 2 siblings,5 3 steppar-
ents,54 any relative55 or "any person interested in the child's
welfare. ' 56 The statutes vary from state to state and often
116 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 61.13(2)(b)(2)(C), 68.08 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1982);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1976 & Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 607 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984), ch. 110-1/2, § 11-7.1
(Smith-Hurd 1978); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.7-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1983-1984);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West Supp.
1984); LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 157 (West Supp. 1984); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-602 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West Supp. 1983-1984);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27 (Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022
(West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.400 - .402 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-9-102 (1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.17 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-9-1 to -4 (1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.5(j) (1976 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.05, .11 (Baldwin Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5
(West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.121, .123 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, §§ 1013-1014 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-24.1 to -24.2
(1981 & Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-52 to -54 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-837,
-1101, -1102 (1977 & Supp. 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (Vernon 1975 &
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 20-107.2
(1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (Supp. 1983-1984); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-
15 (1980); WIs. STAT. §§ 767.245, 880.155 (1981-82).
51. In addition, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914 (1981) provides that following di-
vorces, the family court retains jurisdiction to make future orders regarding custody
and visitation and authorizes intervention by "any interested party." In making a
determination of the best interests of the child, the court is instructed to consider the
child's interrelationships and interactions "with his or her parent or parents, his or
her siblings, and any other person who may emotionally or psychologically affect the
child's best interests." Id. This statute arguably permits a grandparent to petition for
visitation privileges; however, it has never been so construed by a court.
52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 197.5 (West 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 607 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123 (1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1013-1014 (Purdon
Supp. 1983-1984); Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1981-82).
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West
Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123 (1979).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-837 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (1983).
55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Baldwin Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 20-
107.2 (1983).
56. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); CAL. CrV. CODE § 4601 (West 1983);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1984); HAWAH REV. STAT. § 571-46
(1976 & Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, § 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978);
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are vague and in conflict with other statutes. 7 Some state
legislatures have amended their statutes because miscon-
structions had defeated the legislative intent.5 8 In short,
many of the statutes created as many problems as they were
designed to solve.
Forty states59 now permit a court to grant the parents of
divorcing parties visitation rights with children of the mar-
riage. Most of these statutes provide that once a divorce has
occurred, a parent of either party, including the custodial
parent, may petition for visitation privileges.60  These stat-
utes enable a grandparent to commence an action against a
custodial parent, including his or her own child.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27 (Supp. 1983-1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.05 (Baldwin Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (Supp. 1983-
1984).
57. See infra notes 118-61 and accompanying text for discussion of the often-
existing conflict between visitation and adoption statutes.
58. See infra note 122.
59. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); ARtz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34.1211.1 (Supp.
1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-116 (Supp.
1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13
(West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1982); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 571-46
(1976 & Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 607
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.7-1 to -8 (West Supp.
1983-1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572
(West Supp. 1984); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 157 (West. Supp. 1984); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27 (Supp.
1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.400
(Vernon Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.17 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-9-1, -3 (1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.50) (1976 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05 (Baldwin Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5
(West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.121, .123 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, §§ 1013-1014 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.2 (Supp.
1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-52 to -53 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-837, -1101 (1977
& Supp. 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1984); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (1983); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2-15 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (Supp. 1983-1984); Wis. STAT.
§ 767.245 (1981-82).
60. The exceptions are ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983-1984);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.2 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-1 to -2 (Supp.
1983); and W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980), which are applicable only to the parents of
the noncustodial parent, and even then, only if the noncustodial parent is unable to
visit the child on his or her own behalf.
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Thirty-four states61 permit a grandparent to petition for
visitation if one or both of the grandchild's parents are de-
ceased. These statutes often differ in their applicability.
Some grant the right of visitation only to the grandparent
whose own child has died.62 The majority of the grandpar-
ent visitation statutes, however, apply equally to paternal
and maternal grandparents, provided the condition prece-
dent, namely, that either of the grandchild's parents is de-
ceased, has been met.63 This provision can engender
litigation between the grandparent and his or her own child,
but illogically limits such litigation to a situation where the
child's spouse has died. It is unlikely that legislatures con-
templated or intended this inconsistency.
B. Application of the Statutes
The visitation statutes do not give a grandparent an auto-
matic right to visitation with a grandchild; rather, they
61. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-135 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West 1984); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-1-116 (Supp. 1983);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.08 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1982); IDAHO
CODE § 32-1008 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, § 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.7-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1983-1984); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.35 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN § 38-129 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 405.021 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West Supp. 1984); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 157 (West Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West
Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.402 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 123.123 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-9-2 to -3 (1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1977); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Baldwin Supp.
1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 5 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 109.121, .123 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1013-1014 (Purdon Supp. 1983-
1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-52 to -53 (Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1101 (1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp.
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983); WIs. STAT. § 880.155 (1981-
82).
62. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 57-135 (Supp. 1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 257.022 (West 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
1101 (1977).
63. See supra note 61. But ef. Gault, Statutory Grandchild Visitation, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 474, 484 (1973).
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merely give the grandparent the right to be heard in court.64
Under virtually all of the visitation statutes, the grandparent
seeking visitation has the burden of proving that such visita-
tion will be in the child's best interests .6  The factors deter-
minative of "the best interests of the child" are the same as
existed under the common law.66 One jurisdiction, however,
has held that its visitation statute "creates a presumption
that the best interests of the child[ren] ordinarily are served
by maintaining their contact and communication with their
grandparents, 67 thus shifting the burden of proof to the par-
ent who opposes visitation.
After a grandparent has presented his or her case, the
parent is permitted to rebut the grandparent's case by
presenting countervailing evidence of the supposed detri-
mental effects visitation will have on the children, thus creat-
ing a triable issue of fact. 8 It has been held, however, that
the existence of animosity and ill-feelings between a parent
and grandparent is an insufficient reason for denial of visita-
tion because, as one court observed, "[iut is almost too obvi-
ous to state that, in cases where grandparents must use legal
procedures to obtain visitation rights, some degree of ani-
mosity exists between them and the party having custody of
the child or children. Were it otherwise, visitation could be
achieved by agreement. ' 69
64. Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522, 526, 355 N.E.2d 372, 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d
412, 415 (1976).
65. But see HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1976 & Supp. 1983), and ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110-1/2, § 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978), which provide that visitation rights
shall be granted unless it is shown that such visitation would be detrimental to the
child, thereby placing the burden upon the child's parents.
66. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 32.
67. Globman v. Globman, 158 N.J. Super. 338, _, 386 A.2d 390, 394 (1978).
68. See In re Adoption of Berman, 44 Cal. App. 3d 687, 697, 118 Cal. Rptr. 804,
810 (1975).
69. Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522, 526, 355 N.E.2d 372, 374, 387 N.Y.S.2d
412, 414 (1976). AccordGlobman v. Globman, 158 N.J. Super. 338,-. 386 A.2d 390,
395 (1978) ("We do not regard this hostility alone. . . as justifying the extinguish-
ment of the grandparental contact .. "); Johansen v. Lanphear, 95 A.D.2d 973, _,
464 N.Y.S.2d 301, 303 (1983); Lachow v. Barasch, 57 A.D.2d 896, 896, 394 N.Y.S.2d
284, 284 (1977). One commentary on grandparent visitation noted that "[t]he exist-
ence of animosity or hostility between. . . divorced parties, in and of itself, is not a
ground for withholding visitation"; the authors assert that animosity between a par-
ent and grandparent should rest upon the same basis. Foster & Freed, supra note 9, at
661. "Otherwise. . .the custodian may lift himself by his bootstraps by creating
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C Criticisms of the Statutes
A few courts have criticized the grandparent visitation
statutes because they create a cause of action where none
existed at common law and encourage litigation of disputes
which would more appropriately be privately resolved.7 °
Additional resistance to grandparent visitation statutes
originated from a fear that a grandchild may suffer from the
competition of several people for his or her company, which
would inevitably be contrary to the grandchild's best inter-
ests.7' In In re Adoption of a Child by M,72 a New Jersey
court addressed this fear and held that a grandparent's right
of visitation must be derived from the parent's right of visi-
tation. Applying this "derivative theory," if the noncus-
todial parent has visitation privileges, the grandparent
should seek visitation through the parent, making the statute
inapplicable. The grandparent visitation statutes would be
applicable only if the noncustodial parent did not have, or
was unable to exercise, visitation privileges, for, as the New
Jersey Superior Court observed, "[w]hen . . . the noncus-
todial parent has visitation, what right are the grandparents
denied? They can always seek visitation through their own
child. 73 Most courts have rejected the "derivative theory,"
with the majority holding that grandparents' rights arise in-
dependently and therefore no consideration of the
grandchild's parents is warranted.74
At the opposite pole from those who deride the statutes
for abrogating the common law are critics such as Congress-
friction which he then points to as a reason for denying [visitation]." Id. But ef
Thompson v. Thompson, 34 Wash. App. 643, _, 663 P.2d 164, 166 (1983).
70. E.g., In reAdoption of a Child by M, 140 N.J. Super. 91,355 A.2d 211 (1976);
In re K.L.M., 609 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). See generally Gault, supra note
63.
71. In re Adoption of a Child by M, 140 N.J. Super. 91, _., 355 A.2d 211, 213
(1976). See also Gault, supra note 63, at 487-88. This criticism, however, overlooks
the fact that visitation would not be awarded if it was found to indeed be contrary to
the child's best interests.
72. 140 N.J. Super. 91, 355 A.2d 211 (1976).
73. Id. at _ 355 A.2d at 213.
74. See also Sanders v. Sanders, 452 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). See, e.g.,
Barry v. Barrale, 598 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Bennett v. Bennett, 150 N.J.
Super. 509, 376 A.2d 191 (1977).
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man Mario Biaggi of New YorkY.7  Representative Biaggi
has criticized the current visitation statutes because "[t]hey
are vague and they vary, and very frankly, they don't give
[grandparents] all that much. ' 76
The remainder of this comment will address two specific
problems facing the visitation statutes, namely, the effect of
removal of the grandchild from the jurisdiction and the ef-
fect of adoption of the grandchild.
IV. THE EFFECT ON VISITATION OF GRANDCHILD'S
REMOVAL FROM THE JURISDICTION
An issue which has been addressed by neither commen-
tary nor case law 7 concerns the enforcement of court-or-
dered grandparent visitation if the custodial parent desires to
remove the grandchild from the jurisdiction. Because the
topic of restrictions on the residency of custodial parents has
not been previously analyzed with respect to the relatively
new grandparent visitation statutes, this section will analo-
gize this situation to an award of visitation to a noncustodial
parent, note the differences, and suggest a resolution of the
question.
Absent an award of joint physical custody of minor chil-
dren, a typical divorce decree will grant one parent custody
and the other, noncustodial parent reasonable visitation
privileges. 78  Visitation rights granted to the noncustodial
parent are enforceable by court order, and interference with
these rights by the custodial parent may be punishable by a
75. Mario Biaggi sponsored H. Con. Res. 45, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), dis-
cussed supra notes 12-13 and infra note 164 and accompanying text.
76. Grandparents' Rights, supra note 5.
77. But see Fisher v. Fisher, 390 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (per
curiam), wherein it was held that although a trial court properly granted visitation
privileges to paternal grandparents, it erred by forbidding the mother to remove the
grandchildren from their county of residence. Prior to the Fisher decision, Florida
enacted a grandparent visitation statute which provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o
court shall order that a child be kept within the state or jurisdiction of the court solely
for the purpose of permitting visitation by the grandparents." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(2)(b) (West Supp. 1984). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-24.1 to -24.2
(Supp. 1984).
78. Bodenheimer, Equal Rights, Visitation, and the Right to Move, Fain. Advoc.,
Summer 1978, at 18.
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contempt citation 79 or modification of the divorce decree
with an attendant change of custody.80 To avoid these harsh
results, in most cases the custodial parent must seek court
approval prior to removing a child from the jurisdiction for
an extended period of time.8' The requirement of court ap-
proval is commonly imposed by the terms of the divorce de-
cree,82 stipulation of the parties8 3 or state statute."4
Reasons often cited for relocation include the pursuit of
an education, 5 better employment opportunities, 6 the desire
to rejoin other family members,8 7 the health needs of either
the parent or child,88 or the job transfer of the custodial par-
ent or his or her new spouse.8 9 A custodial parent might also
decide to relocate solely to frustrate visitation privileges. As
one commentator pointed out:
There is no more effective way of preventing a non-custo-
dial father from seeing his child than to remove it to a dis-
tant point. Of what practical use to a father are his
79. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ditto, 52 Or. App. 609, _, 628 P.2d 777, 779
(1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(4) (West Supp. 1984).
80. E.g., Daghir v. Daghir, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609
(1982) (custody given to father during mother's absence from state); Fritschler v.
Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973) (custodial mother moved without
court approval; custody was then transferred to the father); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.175(4) (West Supp. 1984). Such transfers of custody have been called "punitive
custody modifications" because the change of custody is effected in order to punish a
custodial parent who violates a court order by leaving the local jurisdiction.
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Unfform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act andRemain-
ing Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modification, 65 CALIF.
L. REV. 978, 1003-04 (1977). Professor Bodenheimer argues that custody modifica-
tion should stem from the well-being of the child, rather than to punish or reward a
parent, and that punitive custody changes are generally not in the child's best interests
because they "disrupt the stability and continuity of the child's environment." Id at
1004, 1005 n.157.
81. See generally Note, A Proposed "Best Interests" Test for Removing A Child
from the Jurisdiction ofthe Noncustodial Parent, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 497-98 &
nn.33-34.
82. Id.
83. Cf. 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CON-
TRACTS § 14, at 14-85 to -86 (rev. ed. 1983).
84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(3) (West Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT.
§ 767.245(6) (1981-82).
85. E.g, Harris v. Harris, 57 Misc. 2d 672, 293 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1968).
86. E.g., Gottschall v. Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982).
87. E.g., Tandy v. Tandy, 42 M. App. 3d 87, 355 N.E.2d 585 (1976).
88. Id.
89. E.g., Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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visitation rights, decretal or contractual, if he has to go
hundreds, if not thousands, of miles to exercise them?90
The same can surely be said of a grandparent's visitation
privileges. 91
Courts faced with a custodial parent's petition to relocate
have applied the "best interests of the child" standard, the
same standard used in grandparent visitation determina-
tions.92 However, although applying the same standard,
courts have reached disparate results. Some courts have rea-
soned that it may indirectly benefit the child93 to have a
happy and well-adjusted custodial parent and that it is also
in the best interests of the child to have a continuing rela-
tionship with only one custodial parent.94 Accordingly, such
courts will grant the custodial parent's petition to move un-
less the noncustodial parent can show that moving will have
a detrimental impact on the child. For example, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court recognized an "implicit presumption" 95
that the custodial parent's desire to relocate is in the best
interests of the child.96 The custodial parent, the court rea-
soned, was granted custody precisely because it was in the
child's best interests, and concomitantly, that parent's desire
90. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 83, § 14, at 14-81.
91. Cf Divorce American Style, supra note 2, at 48 ("The law may say that the
grandparent is entitled to visit, but who will keep the parent from moving... ?").
For example, Mr. and Mrs. Harvey Kudler incurred $60,000 in legal fees to obtain
visitation rights with their grandchildren whom they had raised for five years. Within
three months of the New York court's order granting visitation, the Kudlers' ex-son-
in-law fled, with the children, to Colorado, where a judge refused to recognize the
New York visitation rights and advised them to "forget about the children." Grand-
parents. The Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes: Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on Human Services of the Select Committee on Aging, House of
Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-34 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Simon v. Simon, 435 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Griffin v. Griffin, 424 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Fritschler v. Fritschler,
60 Wis. 2d 283, 288, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973). For a discussion of the "best inter-
ests of the child standard," see supra note 15.
93. In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 II. App. 3d 341, ._, 408 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1980)
(requirement of a "superficial showing" that the move is consistent with the child's
best interests).
94. Id. See also, e.g., Pender v. Pender, 598 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
Gottschall v. Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982). See generally Profes-
sor Bodenheimer's criticism of punitive custody modifications, supra note 80.
95. Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Minn. 1983).
96. Id. Accord Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, _ 505 P.2d 14, 15-16
(1972).
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to move must also be in the child's best interests. Therefore,
in Minnesota a custodial parent will be permitted to remove
a child from the state unless the noncustodial parent can
overcome the presumption by establishing, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the move is contrary to the child's
best interests.97
In contrast to those courts which place the burden upon
the noncustodial parent to show that the move will be harm-
ful to the child is the approach taken by New York, which
places a heavy burden upon the custodial parent who wishes
to remove the child from the jurisdiction. The New York
Court of Appeals has held that the custodial parent must
show the existence of "exceptional circumstances" in order
to justify removal of the child.98 In Weiss v. Weiss99 the
court indicated that health or educational reasons might be
sufficient, but that the mother's desire to move to Las Vegas
to pursue a singing career was not an exceptional circum-
stance adequate to warrant relocation and the modification
of the visitation order which such relocation would necessar-
ily entail °° The Weiss court concluded that frequent and
regular visits with the father were more beneficial to the
child than the less frequent, though longer, visits which
would occur if the mother was permitted to relocate with the
child. 01The court therefore enjoined the mother from re-
moving the child from New York. One court has aptly sum-
marized the policy reasons opposing relocation, stating,
"[g]enerally it can be said that the best interests of a child
require that he or she be allowed the opportunity to develop
a meaningful relationship with both parents."' 0 2 To protect
the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent, it is
97. Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Minn. 1983). See also Auge v.
Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983).
98. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862,
865 (1981). AccordFritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 289, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339
(1973).
99. 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
100. Id. at 177, 418 N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
101. Id at 176-77, 418 N.E.2d at 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865-66.
102. Ham v. Barnes, 418 So. 2d 166, 167 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982).
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deemed reasonable to prohibit the custodial parent from re-
moving the child from the jurisdiction. 10 3
In conflict with restrictions on the custodial parent's right
to relocate and remove the child from the jurisdiction is the
constitutional right to travel freely. 1°4 It is clear that in the
absence of any visitation rights with which a move will inter-
fere, a parent may relocate with his or her child. Thus, if the
two natural parents of a child are married, they may move
with the child to any point on the globe.10 5
As previously explained, if a divorce has occurred the
visitation rights of the noncustodial parent qualify and limit
the custodial parent's right and liberty to move freely. 0 6 Ex-
tending this analysis, if a divorce has occurred or if one of
the parents is deceased and a court has ordered grandparent
visitation rights pursuant to a statute, 0 7 the question then
arises whether the existence of these rights interferes with the
custodial parent's right to relocate and raise children wher-
ever he or she chooses.
Given the constitutional proportions of the right to
travel, the parent's desire to relocate should be paramount.
If the best interests of the child standard was the sole consid-
eration, it would be reasonable to require a parent to show
the existence of exceptional circumstances to justify a pro-
103. Id.; Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 289, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339-40
(1973) ("Living in Colorado is not as conducive to a normal relationship between a
father and his children. . . as living in the same city.").
104. Martinez v. Bynum, 103 S. Ct. 1838, 1842-43 (1983); Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 125 (1958). The right to travel can be restricted only upon a showing of a com-
pelling interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
105. In such a situation, the grandparents would have to voluntarily arrange v.,ith
the parents to visit the child. In the majority of families this will present no ir or-
mountable challenge, although visits may be infrequent.
106. Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 288-89, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973).
A4ccord Ham v. Barnes, 418 So. 2d 166, 167 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Weiss, 52 N. .2d
170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862.
107. See supra note 50. Grandparent visitation statutes typically authorize the
court to issue such orders as may be necessary to enforce the visitation award, includ-
ing contempt of court. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1211.1, 57-135 (Supp. 1983);
GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-7-3 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 607 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983-1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.400 (Vernon Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. §§ 767.245,
880.155 (1982).
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posed relocation. 08 This conclusion logically follows from a
court's finding, prior to granting a grandparent visitation
privileges, that continued grandparent-grandchild contact
would benefit the grandchild. 0 9 However, in view of the
right to travel1'0 and the mobile nature of modem society, a
court should not restrict a custodial parent's right to relocate,
with the child, solely to accomodate a grandparent's visita-
tion rights. As one court stated, "[i]n today's society it is
simply unrealistic to expect an individual to remain within
one small geographic area for the remainder of his or her
life."' II Additionally, it is clear that married parents can act
upon the desire to relocate, with or without exceptional cir-
cumstances present.
There are distinctions between parents and grandparents,
and there should be corresponding differences in enforce-
ment of their visitation rights. Generally, grandparents do
not exercise parental authority over their grandchildren; the
right to control children's lives belongs to the parents."12
Thus while it may be important for a child to have frequent
contact with both parents so each may shape the child's de-
velopment,1 3 the grandparent-grandchild relationship is
more attenuated. Given the fact that even in harmonious
nuclear families grandparents do not exercise day-to-day re-
sponsibility for their grandchildren, it is not as vital that
grandparent and grandchild see each other on a weekly or
bi-weekly basis as it is for parent and child."4 In relation to
108. See Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862. See generally
Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973).
109. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
I11. Griffin v. Griffin, 424 So. 2d 1228, 1232 (La. Ct. App. 1982). However, re-
strictions imposed upon a custodial parent's right to travel terminate when the young-
est child reaches majority.
112. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
113. See Ham v. Barnes, 418 So. 2d 166, 167 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Weiss v.
Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981); Fritschler v.
Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 289-90, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339-40 (1973).
114. [O]n the one hand, the child's bond to a grandparent is normally not as
indispensable for the child's physical survival and emotional health as the
bond to a parent; on the other hand, a child need never - and usually does
not - abandon the feelings of dependency and trust generated by loving
grandparents.
A. KORNHABER & K. WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 64 (emphasis omitted).
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the parent's right to relocate, the grandparent's right to visi-
tation should be subordinate.
A possible solution to the conflict between court-ordered
grandparental visitation and the parental desire to move is
the modification of the visitation order. Inasmuch as grand-
parents are commonly not involved in daily matters and de-
cisions concerning grandchildren, altering visitation from
frequent short visitation to less frequent but longer intervals
will not be as detrimental to the child as it might be in the
case of a noncustodial parent.'15 Moreover, there are other
modes of access to children, such as long-distance telephone
calls.1 16 A court may consider ordering a parent to permit
telephone access if frequent visitation is impractical.' 17 This
resolution both respects grandparents' visitation rights and
recognizes parents' freedom of mobility.
V. THE EFFECT OF ADOPTION ON VISITATION
PRIVILEGES
The greatest obstacle the grandparent visitation statutes
have encountered is preexisting adoption statutes which
sever an adoptee's relationship with his or her natural fam-
ily. 8 Since visitation statutes are generally applicable only
if the parents of the child are divorced or one of them is
deceased, there is an inherent possibility that the custodial
parent will remarry." 9 When remarriage occurs, the custo-
dial parent's new spouse often adopts the child of the prior
marriage as his or her own.' 20 Similarly, if both of the
child's parents are deceased, the child is typically adopted,
either by a relative or by a stranger.' 21 When this occurs, the
115. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
116. Zaharoff, Access to Children: Towards a Model Stalutefor Third Parties, 15
FAM. L.Q. 165, 166 (1981).
117. Cf. id. at 166 n.3.
118. See Note, supra note 33, at 393-400; Note, Aegerter v. Thompson: Divesting
Grandparents of Statutory Grandchild Visitation Rights by Stepparent Adoption, 50
UMKC L. REv. 231 (1982). For a discussion of severance of family ties between
adoptees and their natural families, see generally Comment, Adoption Records Re-
form: Impact on Adoptees, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 110 (1983).
119. Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, _, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (1975).
120. Id
121. See, e.g., People ex rel. Simmons v. Sheridan, 98 Misc. 2d 328,414 N.Y.S.2d
83 (Sup. Ct. 1979), af'd sub nom. People ex re. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320,
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grandparent-grandchild relationship is frequently severed as
the grandchild is assimilated into a new family unit with a
new set of grandparents.
Statutes in sixteen states 122 presently specify the effect of
a child's adoption on a grandparent's visitation rights. Only
four of these statutes provide that any adoption will termi-
nate rights the grandparent would otherwise have. 123  The
remaining eleven provide that the visitation statute will not
be defeated if the child is adopted by either a natural relative
or a stepparent. 124 If such provisions were universally en-
acted, the greatest barrier to a grant of visitation under the
statutes would be largely eliminated. Unfortunately, the
majority of jurisdictions do not statutorily address the effect
of the grandchild's adoption. In most states, whenever a
child is adopted, a conflict arises between the visitation stat-
utes and the adoption statutes. 125 The responses of courts
faced with this conflict have varied significantly.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has twice addressed the ef-
fect of a grandchild's adoption on a grandparent's visitation
rights. The Arkansas court has held that grandparents who
possess court-ordered visitation rights "are constitutionally
429 N.E.2d 1049, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1981); People ex rel Levine v. Rado, 54 Misc. 2d
843, 283 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1967); In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985 (Okla. 1977).
122. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 197.5 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2,
§ 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West Supp. 1983); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§257.022 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 123.123 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-4 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1
(Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16 (West Supp. 1983-1984); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 1015 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-54
(Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1102 (1977); TEX. FAM. CODE § 16.09 (Vernon
1975 & Supp. 1984).
It should be noted that the Oklahoma and Texas provisions were amended in
response to errant judicial interpretations. See In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985 (Okla. 1977);
Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
123. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983-1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110-1/2, § 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978); NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.123 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-9-4 (1983).
124. See supra note 122.
125. See, e.g., Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, _, 332 A.2d 199, 202 (1975). See
also Browning v. Tarwater, 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135 (1974); Deweese v. Craw-
ford, 520 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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entitled to receive notice of an adoption proceeding."''2 6
However, the court's narrow holdings provide that although
grandparents who have been granted visitation have suffi-
cient interest to intervene in adoption proceedings, such in-
tervention is:
for the limited purpose of offering such evidence as may be
relevant to the focal issue, i.e., whether the proposed adop-
tion is in the best interest of the children. . . If the court
resolves the issue in favor of adoption, of course [the
grandparents'] legal right of visitation is automatically
extinguished. 127
Many other courts facing the same issue have reasoned
that since adoption statutorily terminates a child's relation-
ship with his or her natural family, 2 8 the natural grandpar-
ents are clearly not the child's legal grandparents. 129 In fact,
the natural grandparents are legally strangers to the child.
As such, the visitation statute does not apply and the grand-
parents lack standing to petition for visitation privileges. 30
This strict interpretation summarily precludes evaluation of
126. Brown v. Meekins, 278 Ark. 67, _, 643 S.W.2d 553, 554-55 (1982) (four-
teenth amendment due process, "at the very least, requires reasonable opportunity to
be heard."); Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, _ 611 S.W.2d 757, 758 (1981). But see
Aegerter v. Thompson, 610 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), wherein the court held
that the grandparents had no right to notice of adoption proceedings initiated by a
stepfather. The court observed that "the grandparents had only an inchoate right
under a statute permitting a court to grant or deny them reasonable visitation
rights.. . . [The grandparents] had no constitutionally protected interest . Id
at 310 (emphasis added).
127. Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, _, 611 S.W.2d 757, 759 (1981).
128. Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522, 525-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
See also In re K.S., 654 P.2d 1050, 1051 (Okla. 1982) (grandparent visitation statute
held inapplicable because it refers to the grandchild's deceased or divorced parent;
"[n]o reference or inference is made as to a grandparent of a child who's [sic] parent
has had his or her parental rights terminated").
129. Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See
also Ex parte Bronstein, 434 So. 2d 780, 782 (Ala. 1983); Schumacher v. Schumacher,
120 Ill. App. 3d 50, _, 458 N.E.2d 94, 96-97 (1983).
130. See supra note 129. Accord Browning v. Tarwater, 215 Kan. 501, _, 524
P.2d 1135, 1139 (1974); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Okla. 1980) (adoption
by a stepparent); In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985, 986 (Okla. 1977) (adoption by a relative).
In the few jurisdictions which permit a court to award visitation rights to "any person
interested in the child's welfare," the change in legal status would not necessarily
preclude the natural grandparents' petition; however, such jurisdictions are rare. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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the child's best interests.' 3'
This approach was illustrated in a Kansas case, Browning
v. Tarwater.132 In Browning, the paternal grandmother had
been awarded visitation privileges prior to the child's adop-
tion by her stepfather.1 33 The Kansas Supreme Court held
that the grandmother's existing right to visitation automati-
cally terminated the moment the adoption occurred.' 34 The
explanation provided by the court was that the adoptive fa-
ther should not be subjected to the influence of a third
party.135 The dissent in Browning observed that as a result of
the decision, an adoptive parent attained rights superior to
those of the natural parent.136 The dissent also criticized the
majority for not considering the child's best interests. 137 The
child's best interests, concluded the dissent, would not be
achieved by terminating preexisting grandparent-grandchild
visitation. 38
Some courts facing this conflict have held that the grand-
parent visitation statutes prevail over adoption statutes. 39
However, these cases have dealt with adoption by steppar-
ents or relatives. A distinction has wisely been made be-
tween adoption by stepparents or relatives and adoption by
strangers. 140 In the latter situation, the adopted child usually
131. See Note, Adoption: Visitation Rights of Natural Grandparents, 32 OKLA. L.
REV. 645, 650-51 (1979).
132. 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135 (1974).
133. Id. at 524 P.2d at 1137.
134. Id at - 524 P.2d at 1139-40.
135. Id. at 524 P.2d at 1140.
136. Id at 524 P.2d at 1140-41 (Fontron, J., dissenting).
137. Id The natural mother was bound by the court-ordered visitation. Follow-
ing the adoption, the adoptive father possessed power to veto such visitation. A com-
parable result was obtained at common law. See Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Lee is discussed supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
138. Browning, 215 Kan. at - 524 P.2d at 1141 (Fontron, J. dissenting).
139. See, e.g., Reeves v. Bailey, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 126 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1975);
Roquemore v. Roquemore, 275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1969); Mimkon
v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975); Scranton v. Hutter, 40 A.D.2d 296, 339
N.Y.S.2d 708 (1973).
140. People ex rel. Wilder v. Director, Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Chil-
dren, 93 Misc. 2d 617, _ 403 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1978). AccordReeves v.
Bailey, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1026, 126 Cal. Rptr. 51, 56 (1975) (distinguishing adop-
tion by maternal grandparents from a "normal adoption where the child receives two
new parents and both of the natural parents and their families are substituted out.");
Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, _ 332 A.2d 199, 203 (1975).
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must adapt to two entirely new families, 14 1 whereas in the
former situation the child's family relationships and living
arrangements may not have undergone a dramatic change as
a result of the adoption.142
Courts which have held that visitation statutes prevail
over adoption statutes have utilized diverse reasoning to
support this conclusion. In Reeves v. Bailey, 143 the California
Court of Appeal faced a situation similar to that of Browning
v. Tarwater.44 In Reeves the paternal grandparents were
awarded visitation rights under the California statute. 45
The court held that those preexisting visitation rights were
not automatically terminated by the child's subsequent
adoption by his maternal grandparents, but rather depended
solely upon the child's best interests. 46 Another approach
yielding the same result is illustrated in Roquemore v. Ro-
quemore,147 where the California Court of Appeal held that
the California statute which terminates natural family rela-
tionships was intended solely for the purpose of determining
rights of succession and inheritance and therefore did not
apply to prevent the natural grandparents from seeking visi-
tation privileges under the statutes. 48
Yet another analysis was offered in Mimkon v. Ford, 14 9 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a lower court
ruling that adoption terminates the right of grandparents to
petition for visitation.'50 The supreme court determined that
both the adoption and visitation statutes had the best inter-
ests of the child as their central purpose; thus, the statutes
141. People ex rel. Simmons v. Sheridan, 98 Misc. 2d 328, _ 414 N.Y.S.2d 83,
85 (Sup. Ct. 1979), aj'd sub nom. People ex rel Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320,
429 N.E.2d 1049, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1981).
142. Reeves v. Bailey, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1026, 126 Cal. Rptr. 51, 56 (1975).
143. 53 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 126 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1975).
144. 215 Kan. 501,524 P.2d 1135 (1974). See supra notes 132-38 and accompany-
ing text.
145. Reeves, 53 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
146. Id. at 1026, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
147. 275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1969).
148. Id. at _, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34.
149. 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975).
150. Id. at _, 332 A.2d at 202.
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were inpari materia.15 1 This approach presumes that when
the visitation statute was enacted, the legislature considered
the effect of the adoption statute.1 52 Construing the statutes
inpari materia, the court held that the visitation statute pre-
vailed because it was enacted after the adoption statute.
53
Perhaps the simplest and most reasonable approach is
that propounded by New York courts in Scranton v. Hut-
ter 154 and People ex rel. Simmons v. Sheridan.'- Both cases
involved children who were adopted: in Scranton by a step-
parent; 156 in Simmons by the paternal grandparents. 157 Both
courts determined that, in view of the fact that adoption is
common when parents are divorced or deceased, the purpose
of New York's visitation statute would be frustrated if the
natural grandparents were not permitted to petition for visi-
tation privileges. 58  Both cases were therefore remanded to
the trial court for determination of the best interests of the
children involved. 159 The New York courts have wisely lim-
ited application of this analysis to cases of adoption by a
relative or stepparent, recognizing a difference between such
a situation and the situation in which a child is adopted by
strangers. 60 Those visitation statutes which specify the ef-
fect of a grandchild's adoption upon a grandparent's visita-
tion rights similarly recognize this distinction.' 6 1
151. Id. at _ 332 A.2d at 202-03. See generally 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 51.03 (4th ed. 1973). Statutes are inparimateria if they relate to the
same subject matter. Id
152. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03 (4th ed. 1973). It is
debatable whether visitation and adoption statutes are truly in pari materia since visi-
tation statutes generally make no reference to adoption and it appears that few state
legislatures have considered the effect of adoption upon visitation rights.
153. Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, - 332 A.2d 199, 203 (1975). See also Note,
supra note 131.
154. 40 A.D. 2d 296, 339 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1973).
155. 98 Misc. 2d 328, 414 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1979), affdsub nom. People ex
rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1981).
156. Scranton, 40 A.D.2d at 296, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
157. Simmons, 98 Misc. 2d at _ 414 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
158. Scranton, 40 A.D.2d at 298,339 N.Y.S.2d at 710-11; Simmons, 98 Misc. 2d at
- 414 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
159. Scranton, 40 A.D.2d at 299, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 711; Simmons, 98 Misc. 2d at
414 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
160. Scranton, 40 A.D.2d at 299, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 711; Simmons, 98 Misc. 2d at
414 N.Y.S.2d at 85-86. AccordDripps v. Dripps, 366 So. 2d 544 (La. 1978).
161. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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In view of the "best interests of the child" standard, ap-
proval should be bestowed upon those courts which have, by
utilization of varied analyses, determined that grandparent
visitation rights are not automatically terminated by an
adoption. However, due to the decisions of many state
courts which defeat the purpose of the visitation statutes,
universal legislative determination of the effect of adoption
is advisable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislative response to grandparents lobbying for vis-
itation has been overwhelmingly positive, as is evidenced by
the forty-one states with grandparents' visitation statutes.' 62
However, these statutes are inconsistent in their applica-
tion.' 63 In addition, the statutes have been the subject of
countless interpretations and misinterpretations. Judicial
resistance to and confusion about the statutes has likewise
been strong. Nevertheless, despite their imperfections, the
statutes are a positive step in the family law area inasmuch
as their goal is fulfillment of the "best interests of the child."
In 1983, the United States House of Representatives
passed a resolution, now pending in the United States Sen-
ate, "[e]xpressing the sense of the Congress that a uniform
state act should be developed and adopted which provides
grandparents with adequate rights to petition state courts for
privileges to visit their grandchildren following the dissolu-
tion (because of divorce, separation, or death) of the mar-
riage of such grandchildren's parents."' 64 Passage of this
resolution and enactment of uniform visitation laws will pro-
mote the child's best interests more effectively than the cur-
rent collection of statutes and case law is capable of doing.
In addition to the benefits of uniformity among the states,
such legislation will assure grandparents that their rights will
162. See supra note 50.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 50-63.
164. S. Con. Res. 40, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). H.R. Con. Res. 45, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983), containing identical language, was passed by the House of Represent-
atives on April 19, 1983. Passage of the resolution constitutes "a call for the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to 'develop a model act."'
Biaggi, Grandparent Visitation, 6 FAM. ADVOC. 39 (Spring 1984). See generally
Zaharoff, supra note 116.
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exist despite relocation or adoption of their grandchildren.
The current problem-ridden visitation statutes should be
considered a temporary solution until national uniformity
becomes a reality.
PATRICIA WENDLANDT
